here that a death by natural causes was neither just nor unjust whereas a death caused by a human being could be either. In other words, human beings apply value terms like "justice" to human actions but not to natural events - which, in legal terminology, are "acts of God." In this sense, "God" also is neither just nor unjust.
SM Stirling's character, Tiphaine, reflects:
"...a woman had to work harder to build upper-body strength, and train harder to maintain it, one of life's manifold injustices."
-SM Stirling, A Meeting At Corvallis (New York, 2007), Chapter Nineteen, p. 512.
However, Tiphaine is not contradicting my view of injustice but applying this word in an extended and ironic sense. When I studied Law, the phrase, "...in accordance with the dictates of natural justice...," was used but this meant what people usually or naturally think of as justice not that some kind of justice was built into non-human nature. Christian theologians conceived of a natural moral law whereas others distinguish between the realms of nature and of value judgments. Some of this is down to changing uses of words. However, the fact remains that moral and legal judgments become applicable when a man is killed by another man but not when he is killed by a wild animal or an avalanche, an "act of God." I do not expect to find a moral agent behind nature.